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Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this 
claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by 
phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and 
dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, 
focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for 
factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology and epistemology 
of visual perception.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Our visual scene is parsed into coherent units called visual objects (Feldman, 2003; 
Green, 2018; Scholl et al., 2001). What kind of entities are visual objects? Many 
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philosophers contend that we see actual states of affairs or facts (e.g., Armstrong, 
1997, p. 95, 2012, p. 14; Johnston, 2006; McDowell, 1996). A fact is a complex and 
ontologically heterogeneous entity constituted by a particular plus properties forming 
a non-mereological unity. I call the thesis that we see facts factualism. Suppose you 
see a red rose. If factualism is true, then what you see is a complex entity made by a 
particular (the rose) having a property (being red). Factualism has several 
implications. For example, since visual objects are the targets of perception-based 
demonstrative thought, of perceptual attention, and are the «basic units» (Fish, 2009, 
p. 52) of visual perception, it follows that such states are individuated by means of 
entities belonging to two different categorical kinds: properties and particulars. 
Furthermore, facts are worldly items that «mimic» the structure of judgments 
(Johnston, 2006, p. 290), hence, factualism seems to entail that visual object 
perception has a sentence-like structure (Armstrong, 1997, p. 96; Textor, 2009). 
Factualism, however, is not unchallenged. Alternatively, one may construe visual 
objects as property-complexes or bundles. 
 Many philosophers take factualism as a truism. Fish’s (2009) 
work represents an interesting exception. In his book, he makes a case for factualism 
based on two claims, which I call the phenomenological and the scientific claim. The 
former is that there would be phenomenological evidence that we see facts. The 
scientific claim is more interesting. Fish thinks that scientific studies on object 
detection and tracking support factualism. I set out to show that the scientific claim 
does not support factualism, and provides indirect support for an alternative, bundle 
view of visual objects.  
 I set the stage in Section 2, clarifying terms and concepts, and 
introducing Fish’s argument for factualism. In Section 3, I elaborate on the alleged 
evidence on which the scientific claim rests. In Section 4, I argue that scientific 
evidence does not support factualism.  
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2. FACTUALISM INTRODUCED  
 
2.1 Seeing and facts 
I take a state of seeing to be a conscious mental state that visually presents or manifests 
some mind-independent entities to the perceiver. Three caveats are in order. First, I 
will only discuss cases of genuine perception. Second, I remain largely neutral about 
the nature of perception. Third, I remain neutral about what makes such states or 
contents conscious.  
 What kinds of entities are made manifest by states of seeing? 
Most researchers agree that states of seeing make manifest a cluster of visual 
properties or features (Wolfe, 1998). Features are constitutive of the contents of 
states of seeing, that is, we always see things as being a certain way (Siegel, 2010, p. 
45; Block, 2014). Although it is uncontroversial that we see objects (O’Callaghan, 
2016; Rosch et al., 1976), there is little agreement about how the cognitive system 
achieves object perception. According to a widely shared view, our visual system 
singles out something as an object if it satisfies principles like cohesion, boundedness, 
rigidity, and no action at a distance (Spelke, 1990, pp 48–51; Burge, 2010, p. 464). 
But what kind of things are visual objects? Assuming that there are properties—
construed in an ontologically liberal way—there are two possible answers to this 
question. One is that visual objects are complex entities made by a property-bearer 
or “particular” plus properties. Another possible answer is that visual objects are 
exhaustively ontologically analyzed by their properties. Call the first option factualism, 
and the latter the bundle-view. In the remainder of this paper, I will use the term 
“object” in a metaphysically neutral way (for either bundles or facts). 
 In the philosophical literature, facts are understood either as 
true propositions or as actual states of affairs (Armstrong, 1997; Betti, 2015; Reicher, 
2009; Vallicella, 2000). It is only the latter concept that will be discussed here. Facts, 
in this sense, are taken to be semantically idle, complex entities that constitute the 
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building blocks of the world. Facts can be of two types (Armstrong, 1997, pp. 28–
29) either: particulars exemplifying properties—such as “a being F” (the rose’s being 
red); or two particulars exemplifying a relation—as in “a having R to b” (the rose is 
to the left of the perceiver) (Mulligan et al., 1984)1. Following Fish (2009, p. 22), I 
will only discuss facts of the former type. Facts are categorically heterogeneous entities 
(Betti, 2015, pp. 20–22), because they comprise entities that belong to distinct 
ontological categories with different ontological statuses, a particular (the rose) and 
an abstract entity (a property, e.g., “being red”) (Smith, 1989, p. 422) that form a 
unity that is more (“over and above”) than the simple mereological sum of its 
constituents. Facts thus form a non-mereological and non-spatial unity over and 
above their constituents (Armstrong, 1989, p. 88). However, the properties are 
construed (whether as universals or tropes), properties and particulars are glued 
together by means of a non-relational tie (Armstrong, 1997, p. 118; 2010, p. 26; 
Devitt, 1997, p. 98). A particular considered without its properties is called a “thin 
particular”, whereas a particular clothed with its properties is called a “thick 
particular” (or simply a “fact”). According to Armstrong, the world is constituted by 
facts, all particulars instantiate (or exemplify) some properties, and all properties are 
instantiated by some particulars, hence thin particulars cannot be found in the world, 
we only obtain them by means of a process of intellectual abstraction (1989, p. 88, 
1997, pp. 123–126).2 
 Notice that the claim that the world is constituted by facts 
(Armstrong, 1997; Russell, 1986, p. 163) is logically independent from the claim that 
we see facts. In this paper, I will only explore the latter claim.  
 
2.2 Factualism, the bundle-view, and fish’s argument 
	
1 The terminology is often unclear. Particulars are sometimes called “substances” (Garcia, 2014), or “objects” (Fish, 
2009). For clarity’s sake, I opt for the term “particular”. 
2 It has been pointed out to me by a reviewer that this seems to suggest that facts may be ontologically basic, while 
properties and particulars may be ontologically derivative. Alternatively, one might construe facts as derivative entities 
that exist in addition to properties and particulars. This is a genuine metaphysical issue, but resolving it either way does 
not bear on my argument. 
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Factualism (FT) is the claim that visual objects are facts:  
 
FT: Visual objects are complex entities, that is, facts, whose categorically 
heterogeneous constituents are particulars instantiating properties which form 
a non-mereological unity over and above their constituents. 
 
An alternative to FT is the bundle view (BV): 
 
BV: Visual objects are property bundles. 
 
Pautz describes an instance of BV, the property-complex theory: “P is a complex property 
iff, necessarily, x instantiates P iff x has parts x1, x2, x3, which have properties P1, P2, 
P3 … and stand in relations R1, R2, R3 … ” (2007, p. 498).3 On BV, in contrast with 
FT, perception does not predicate properties of an ontologically distinct particular. 
There is no co-presence of a feature and its “fundament” (the particular) in seeing 
(Mulligan et al., 1984, p. 308).  
 FT and BV differ in structure and ontological scope.4 The 
contrast between FT and BV touches also on the issue of how to construe conditions 
of accuracy, if perception is representational. If FT is true, perceptual states are 
satisfied iff they represent particulars having properties. If BV is true, content is 
satisfied iff there is a corresponding property instantiation (Pautz, 2007, p. 499). 
 Before I proceed, let me fend off two possible confusions. The 
first is that BV entails a possible, but ultimately wrong conception of visual 	
3 Textor has suggested an alternative to FT that goes in the direction of BV: “Seeing x is constituted by seeing features, 
states or changes of x and additional factors … I see x in virtue of seeing its features, states or changes” (2009, p. 141). 
There is of course a difference between the claim that visual objects are constituted by properties (and perhaps states and 
changes), and the claim that seeing a visual object is constituted by properties as well as other factors (arguably, attention, 
etc.; Driver et al., 2001; Scholl, 2001). I focus on the former view. 
4 Nominalists might claim that we see objects, properties being derivative entities. One could undermine FT by simply 
denying ontological credit to facts. Here, I set out to argue that, even if the world is constituted by facts, there is no 
reason to believe that we see facts. 
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perception. According to an old empiricist view, perception only delivers an array of 
features, but it is thought (concepts) that carve-up the visual field into objects 
(Dickie, 2010, p. 214; Lewis, 1966)5. There are good empirical reasons for rejecting 
this view: The visual scene is parsed into objects already at a pre-attentive and pre-
conceptual level (Dickie, 2010; Raftopoulos, 2009). Notice however that BV does 
not per se entail the old empiricist view (not without further assumptions). 
 The second potential mistake is to confuse FT with what 
Dretske called visual “fact-awareness” (1979, 2010). For Dretske, one is fact-aware that 
a is F iff one has the concept of F and applies it to a. Still, one may be able to see 
(simple seeing) something even without the relevant concept. So, to use his example, 
at a time t I may see that x is an armadillo (seeing-that) thanks to my possession of the 
concept “ARMADILLO”; while previously, lacking the relevant concept, I might 
have simply seen x (simple seeing). FT is distinct from “fact-awareness” as the 
relevant notion of “fact” in the two cases is different: actual states of affairs (FT), 
and true propositions (fact-awareness). 
 There are some reasons that make factualism unpalatable. 
Firstly, visual objects are generally defined in mereological terms: Treisman (1986) 
call them “complex wholes” and Di Lollo “coherent, unified wholes” (2012, p. 317) 
(also Feldman, 2003; O’Callaghan, 2016). But facts as we have seen are non-
mereological units. Therefore, if a single visual object is a fact, it seems difficult to 
account for its spatial-mereological structure (Mulligan, 1999). Secondly, it seems 
that object-directed states of seeing should be individuated by, and make consciously 
manifest, two kinds of entities which form a non-mereological unity. 
 Fish’s argument for factualism consists of two claims. First, 
Fish believes that reflection upon our everyday perceptual phenomenology supports 
factualism. He invites us to consider in this vein Firth’s observation: “the qualities of 
	
5 A more recent statement of this view can be found in Spelke: “Perceptual systems do not package the world into 
units. The organization of the perceived world into units may be a central task of human systems of thought” (quoted 
in Dickie, 2010). 
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which we are conscious in perception are … presented to us … as the qualities of 
physical objects” (1965, p. 222). Call this the phenomenological claim. Second, Fish 
maintains that experimental studies on object perception support factualism. In 
particular, he refers to studies on multiple object tracking (MOT) (Blaser et al., 2000), 
and to Matthen’s (2005) discussion of dynamic feature-object integration:  
 
Matthen has also argued that certain empirical results are adequately explained 
only on the assumption that we do not see properties or qualities simpliciter, 
but rather see objects bearing properties (Fish, 2009, pp. 51, 52). 
 
Call this the scientific claim. If the passage is meant to support FT, then clearly Fish 
construes “objects” as belonging to a distinct ontological category, that is, what I 
called “particulars”, and he must be assuming that objects and properties form a 
single non-mereological categorically heterogeneous entity (Section 3.4). What we 
see therefore are complex entities, particulars having properties. 
 Let me briefly turn to the phenomenological claim. That we 
see things being some way or another is nothing more than a truism that does not 
reveal anything interesting about the things we see. Ultimately, one could frame 
Firth’s quotation within a nominalist outlook, or opt for a bundle account of objects.6 
The assumption that observation will reveal the metaphysical nature of visual objects 
is, I believe, unwarranted. States of seeing do not manifestly reveal the ontological 
constituents of what we see (Ayers, 2004, p. 255). Were it not so, it would be difficult 
to explain why, on the basis of phenomenological evidence alone, philosophers have 
	
6 Many philosophers frame perception in terms of property predication. When I see a red rose, my visual system 
predicates the property (redness) of the particular (the rose). So, one could think that this alone supports FT. (Thanks 
to Alexander Staudacher for pointing this out to me.) Yet, nothing in this frame forces us to accept factualism. For 
instance, the visual system might predicate properties of bundles. 
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harbored very different intuitions about the ultimate nature of objects. States of 
seeing are metaphysically opaque about the nature of content.7  
 The scientific claim provides a non-phenomenological way to 
assess the question of the nature of visual objects. Is there really scientific evidence 
that we see facts?  
 
 
3. SENSORY INDIVIDUALS AND SENSORY REFERENCE. 
 
3.1 Binding and places 
The alleged experimental evidence for factualism is drawn from the literature on the 
problem of feature-object binding, object detection, and tracking. The former 
consists in explaining how different visual properties are attached to the same 
individual (Clark, 2000; Treisman, 1996; Jackson, 1977, p. 64). The problem can be 
studied from different perspectives. Philosophers interested in object perception 
should provide a solution to the representational binding problem, and explain the 
nature of visual objects. This is different from articulating an account of how the 
brain binds different features into one coherent whole, a single visual object. In order 
to bring the problem into sharper focus, consider the following:  
 
(1) S sees something red. 
(2) S sees something triangular.  
(3) S sees something both red and triangular (a red triangle).  
 
	
7 To put things slightly differently, philosophical disagreement about the nature of visual objects seems only plausible 
in virtue of some metaphysical opacity of seeing. 
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Clark (2000) pointed out that (3) does not follow from (1-2). Seeing something red 
and seeing something triangular is different from seeing a red triangle. The problem 
is compounded if we introduce a further visual object, say, a blue circle. How does 
the cognitive system sort the properties in the right way, that is, blue with circular 
and red with triangular? In order to solve this problem, Clark proposed a theory of 
sensory individuals (Cohen, 2004). According to this theory, properties must be 
attached to or predicated of specific individuals. 
 What are sensory individuals? For Clark (2000, p. 164), sensory 
features or properties are predicated of places. S sees redness and triangularity here, 
and blueness and circularity there. To borrow Evans (1982) terminology, location in 
space provides the “fundamental ground of difference” (p. 107) that allows featural 
attribution to the right individual (Clark, 2004, pp. 136–144). Binding sensory 
features to places is an elegant solution. However, it is often considered untenable. 
It has been argued that the feature-place hypothesis is at variance with experimental 
evidence (Cohen, 2004; Matthen, 2004, 2005; Pylylshyn, 2007; Siegel, 2002a). On the 
basis of this evidence some researchers conclude that sensory individuals must be 
objects (Cohen, 2004, p. 480). Fish’s scientific claim is based on two challenges 
against the feature-placing hypothesis: the problem of co-located objects (Blaser et 
al., 2000; Section 3.2.1) and the problem of dynamic feature-object binding (Matthen 
2005; Section 3.2.2). 
 
3.2 Sensory individuals as material objects 
3.2.1 Superimposed objects  
A problem for Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis is that it is apparently unable to 
account for binding of co-located objects. This is shown by a series of experiments 
conducted by Blaser et al. (2000) on multiple object tracking (Pylyshyn, 2003, 2004; 
Scimeca & Franconeri, 2015). Blaser and collaborators investigated the visual 
system’s ability to track distinct items within the same spatio-temporal trajectories. 
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In the experiments, subjects observed two circular striped Gabor patches 
transparently layered upon one another, without noticeable separation in depth 
(2000). The Gabors underwent different changes, for example spinning clockwise 
and then counterclockwise, or changed saturation, from gray and black stripes to red 
and black stripes. The featural changes occurred without any change in location, thus 
testing whether object perception essentially involves the location of features.  
 Blaser and colleagues found that the observers reported that 
the Gabors were perceptually segregated, in a way similar to figure-ground 
segmentation. The attended Gabor stood out in the foreground, whereas the 
distractor Gabor receded in the background. Moreover, the experimenters found 
that featural attention enhanced processing of the Gabor’s features as a whole. From 
these results, Matthen (2005) concludes that the observers “were attending to 
features by attending to the objects to which these features were attributed, and not 
by attending to the features directly” (p. 281).  
 Since subjects were able to discriminate the two superimposed 
but distinct Gabor patches, it would follow that sensory individuals cannot be places: 
Featural binding seems to be object-centered (Matthen, 2005). 
 
3.2.2. Dynamic feature-object binding 
A further problem for the feature-placing hypothesis is that it seems at variance with 
dynamic feature-object binding. Matthen (2005, p. 282) contends that the perception 
of change or of motion demands an identity that underlies change, and locations 
cannot provide such an identity (Siegel, 2002a). He illustrates this point with 
reference to the φ-phenomenon. 
 The φ-phenomenon is a paradigmatic example of illusory 
movement (Dennett, 1991, p. 114). In this experiment a subject observes a screen 
upon which an image—say, a white dot—is shown on the left-hand side. A second 
image—say, an identical white dot—is then shown on the opposite side of the screen. 
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In two different experiments, the researchers change the interstimulus interval 
between the offset and the onset of the two dots. The suitable interstimulus interval 
depends on the spatial separation of the two items, but the phenomenon is often 
tested between 50 and 200msc (Arstila, 2016). In a first experiment, with an interval 
of c. 50,msc subjects will likely see two flashing dots. However, if the interstimulus 
interval is increased up to c. 150msc, subjects will likely experience illusory motion, 
where a single white dot appears to be moving from the left to the right side of the 
board. Kolers & Von Grünau (1976) devised an interesting variation of this 
experiment by changing the color of the second dot. If the interstimulus interval is 
c. 150msc, subjects will see one single dot moving from left to right and changing 
color halfway, say, from white to red (Scholl, 2007, pp. 573–574).  
 Matthen contends that this phenomenon brings further 
evidence against Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis. Our visual systems are sensitive 
to motion, but motion cannot be attributed to places. Suppose that features are place-
indexed, like “red and circular here”, where “here” is the sensory individual: How 
can we make sense of the sensory individual moving? Regions of space do not move, 
therefore cannot be sensory individuals. And if places cannot be sensory individuals, 
the best alternative option is to conclude that vision is committed “to an ontology 
of material objects” (Matthen, 2005, p. 281). Matthen defines a material object as a 
“spatio-temporally confined and continuous entity that can move while taking its 
features with it” (ibid.) (also O’Callaghan, 2008, p. 816). He thereby concludes that 
vision “attribut[es] features to material objects” (Matthen, 2005, p. 280). 8 
Furthermore, he suggests, since we can track an object in spite of featural change—
as shown by the foregoing experiments—material objects must be substances or 
substance-like, as Aristotle suggested:  
	
8 It is unfortunate to call singular perceptual referents “material” objects. Some ephemera like shadows or rainbows 
may also be tracked and perceived as visual objects even though their “material” status is questionable. I stick to 
Matthen’s terminology for two reasons. First, because it is widely adopted. Second, because, in order to avoid 
unnecessary complications, I consider only the fairly unproblematic cases of material objects perception. 
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It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the 
same is able to receive contraries. In no other case could one bring forward 
anything, numerically one, which is able to receive contraries. For example, a 
color which is numerically one and the same will not be black and white … A 
substance, however, numerically one and the same, is able to receive 
contraries. (Categoriae 5, 4a10; in Aristotle, 1963, p. 11; Matthen, 2005, p. 281).  
 
Matthen’s point is that features are attributed to objects rather than places. According 
to Fish, evidence gathered from Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 makes a scientific case for 
FT.  
 
3.3 What sensory individuals do 
Before turning to a critical examination of the scientific claim, we should further 
specify what roles sensory individuals are supposed to play. This is important because 
my argument in Section 4 will critically examine FT from the point of view of what 
sensory individuals do.  
 We have already seen that there are good reasons to believe 
that sensory individuals are material objects. I accept this reading. Sensory individuals 
perform three mutually interdependent functions: to serve as the unifiers to which 
multiple properties are attached; to remain constant through featural change; and to 
provide the fundamental ground of reference that secures detection and tracking. 
 Constancy through featural change is supposed to explain how 
objects can be re-identified across a given spatio-temporal continuity (Scholl, 2007) 
and in spite of featural change (Pylyshyn, 2007, pp. 34–37). Experimental studies 
have shown that featural change does not significantly alter object tracking (Bahrami, 
2003; Scholl et al., 1999). Given that objects may undergo featural changes, it has 
been proposed that the tracked item may be a pure “this”, an a-qualitative individual 
(Skrzypulec, 2018). The “this” would then serve as unifying basis for multiple 
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properties. After an initial pre-attentive and pre-conceptual parsing of the visual 
scene into proto-objects, visual tracking provides a reference for mental object-
related processing to things in the world. On an influential account, once an object 
is detected, indexing connects such an object with an object-file (Green & Quilty-
Dunn, 2017; Kahneman et al., 1992; Recanati, 2012). 
 Several theories have been proposed to account for object 
individuation, indexing, and tracking. On Pylyshyn’s account, the linkage between 
items in the world and object-files is maintained through the assignment of a visual 
index or a bare visual demonstrative (Matthen, 2012; Pylyshyn, 2003, 2007), that he 
calls “FINST”—from “FINgers of INSTantiation”. Put succinctly, the theory claims 
that we possess a limited number of FINST mechanisms (four or five; but cf., 
Franconeri et al., 2013) that detect and track material objects in the environment. 
Pylyshyn sometimes calls the sensory individuals “FINGs”—from “FINSTed 
THINGs” (2007, p. 56)—another name for Matthen’s material objects (Section 3.2). 
FINGs are said to grab a FINST in virtue of some causally relevant properties (ibid., 
p. 68; Section 4.2). Such mechanisms are pre-representational and pre-conceptual: 
They merely register or detect the presence of an object in virtue of a causal, non-
representational relation (ibid., pp. 74–75, 94). Causal-reference is possible thanks to 
a set of non-encoded (i.e., non-represented) properties (2003, p. 219). For Pylyshyn 
tracking mechanisms play the role of fixing reference in a way that resembles that of 
demonstratives like “this” or “that”. Importantly, they do so in a non-descriptive 
manner (2007, p. 95). In a way analogous to the sentence “This is red”, the visual 
system can be said to first assign the index “this”, with the predicate “red” assigned 
in subsequent processing. Consequently, as Pylyshyn (2003) puts it, in vision 
“[p]roperties are predicated of things” (p. 201).9 
 Pylyshyn believes that features cannot fix reference because, 
among other reasons, he thinks that they are only processed at later stages of visual 
	
9 Notice that sensory reference is a distinct problem from that of the role of (mostly conscious) perception in fixing 
demonstrative reference (Siegel, 2002b).	
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information-processing. Not everyone agrees. There is some evidence that 
processing of features begins very early, on the retina itself, where color-related and 
motion-related information is extracted and further processed in a series of 
topographic maps that preserve, to an extent, the spatial arrangement of the proximal 
stimulus (Op de Beeck et al., 2008; Silver & Kastner, 2009; Somers & Shermata, 
2013). But Pylyshyn’s FINST theory is by no means the only psychological account 
of object individuation and tracking. Other options include Leslie et al.’s (1998) 
object-indexing theory, Ballard et al.’s (1997) deictic-codes theory (Raftopoulos, 
2009, p. 98). Pylyshyn’s account falls squarely under what Recanati (2012, pp. 3–14) 
calls the “singularist” camp. Singularists argue for an acquaintance-based theory on 
which reference is fixed thanks to a direct causal link between material objects and 
perceivers via a set of non-represented properties. Descriptivists, on the contrary, 
take as a requirement for reference-fixing that a given set of the target’s properties 
must be represented. 
 In the next pages—although I mainly refer to Pylsyhyn’s 
account for expository reasons—I advance some arguments against FT that are 
compatible with all the foregoing options. This, I believe, makes my case against FT 
even more efficacious.  
 
3.4 Making sense of the scientific claim 
It is helpful to provide some terminological clarity. A sensory individual is any entity x 
that fulfills the three roles identified in the previous section. The feature-placing 
hypothesis has it that sensory individuals are places, but most researchers today 
maintain—for reasons examined in Section 3.2—that sensory individuals must be 
material objects, that is, spatio-temporally confined and continuous entities that can 
move and retain their properties. Material objects thus construed are worldly things. 
Visual objects, meanwhile, are understood as the coherent units that appear in our 
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visual field (Feldman, 2003).10 In order to claim that scientific evidence supports FT 
(a thesis about visual objects), Fish must be making several assumptions that we will 
now examine.  
 Fish’s first assumption seems to be that material objects must 
be facts’ particulars. Otherwise, it would not be clear why Fish thinks that we see 
“object-properties couples” that should be understood as Armstrongian facts (Fish, 
2009, p. 22). A second assumption is that material objects, understood as facts’ 
particulars, and their features (properties) are glued together via a non-relational tie 
(Section 2.1), and that they form a non-mereological unity over and above their 
constituents. The third assumption is that, given states of seeing are conscious mental 
states (Section 2.1), both the particulars and properties which form such a unity are 
somehow consciously visually accessible. Fish interprets the scientific evidence in 
light of these assumptions. I will argue that this reading is untenable or simply 
unwarranted. 
 One way to refute FT would be to show, against Fish’s third 
assumption, that even if material objects are indeed facts’ particulars, they are not 
consciously accessible. Consider an example. In contrast to perceptual Singularism—
the claim that perception is a relation of sensorily entertaining a singular proposition 
specified by object and properties—defenders of general Russellianism argue that 
perceptual content is constituted by a general proposition of the form ∃𝑥(𝐹𝑥) (Tye, 
2000). Such propositions are possible states of affairs, but the perceiver, on this view, 
is only aware of properties, not of objects (facts’ particulars). General Russellianism 
outlines an alternative to FT that we might call weak BV: 
 
	
10 The exact ontology of visual objects will also depend on our theory of perception. For a naïve realist visual objects 
might be constituted by worldly entities; for a Fregean representationalist visual objects may be constituted by modes 
of presentations. My claims are orthogonal to this debate. 
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W-BV: Visual objects are constituted by properties predicated of an unseen 
categorically heterogeneous particular.11  
 
W-BV and FT are incompatible, for the latter claims that, in addition to properties, 
we also see particulars (Mulligan et al., 1984). Nevertheless, W-BV is compatible with 
Fish’s first assumption. Alternatively, one could argue for strong BV:  
 
S-BV: Visual objects are constituted by properties all the way down.  
 
“All the way down” captures the idea that—at the conscious, unconscious, and pre-
attentive stages of perception—perceivers are sensorily related only to the properties 
of material objects. Both W-BV and S-BV have it that visual objects are constituted by 
properties alone. But S-BV is more radical than W-BV as it denies, against Fish’s first 
assumption, that material objects should be interpreted as facts’ particulars.  
 FT and BV render ontologically distinct interpretations of 
visual objects and of sensory individuals. In the remainder of this paper, I simply 
accept that sensory individuals are material objects in the sense specified by Matthen. 
However, as I pointed out, Matthen’s definition of material objects leaves open their 
exact ontological interpretation. In order to support FT, Fish, as we have seen, must 
make the assumption that material objects are facts’ particulars, and that particulars 
plus properties form a further non-mereological unity. I shall challenge this 
assumption and thus provide indirect support for S-BV. By granting that material 
objects qua sensory individuals must play the roles mentioned above (Section 3.3), 
we arrive at a standpoint from which we can examine FT.  
FT obviously assumes that there are worldly facts. For argument’s sake, I shall 
concede this. But recall what I said earlier (Section 2.1): Even if we live in a world of 	
11 For brevity’s sake, I drop the further qualification “forming a non-mereological unity over and above the fact’s 
constituents”.  
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facts, that does not entail that we see facts. In order to assay FT, I will examine 
whether there are good reasons to believe that the visual system detects and tracks 
facts.12 If there are not, we undercut the scientific evidence for FT. Before we 
proceed, we need to specify some ontological criteria.  
 
 
4. EXAMINING THE SCIENTIFIC CLAIM 
 
4.1 Two ontological criteria 
We can think of an ontological inventory as an exhaustive catalogue of ontological kinds. 
The scope of an inventory depends on our region of interest; in our case, the 
ontology of visual objects and sensory individuals. S-BV and FT require different 
ontological inventories. S-BV’s inventory includes only properties, whereas FT’s 
inventory includes properties, particulars, and their unity in facts. Determining 
whether our inventory is complete or not for a given domain depends on the specific 
set of problems that we need to account for (Betti, 2015, p. 62). Some ontological criteria 
are needed; otherwise we might end up adding kinds arbitrarily. Betti (ibid., pp. 62–
63) puts forward two elegant criteria:  
 
C1: Is the problem we are called to solve genuine or not?   
C2: If it is genuine, can it be solved without enlarging our inventory? 
 
C1 states that some problems may be the result of wrong theoretical assumptions; if 
that is the case, there is no need to enlarge our inventory. If the problem is genuine, 
	
12 I pass in silence the two further roles of sensory individuals, as property unifiers, and as providing a constant base 
through featural change, since every metaphysical theory of objecthood accounts, in some way, for these roles. 
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and it cannot be solved within our current inventory, we can vouchsafe the new kind 
a place in our inventory.  
 Let us start with C1. In order to deny that our problem is 
genuine, we would have to rethink the problems of feature-object binding, sensory 
individuals, object detection, and tracking. There are two options. We can deny that 
sensory individuals are material objects, or we can deny that we need sensory 
individuals. Going for the first option, one may try to salvage Clark’s feature-placing 
hypothesis. The second option is more radical: perhaps we can just dispense with 
sensory individuals. One way of doing so could be to reject the binding problem as 
ill-posed (Garson, 2001; Di Lollo, 2012). If any of the two strategies succeeds, Fish’s 
scientific claim collapses.13 For the sake of argument, I accept the current state of the 
art, the problem we are dealing with is a genuine one. 
 
4.2 Detecting and tracking facts? 
Fish assumes that material objects are facts’ particulars (Section 3.4). Facts’ 
particulars can be construed as either “thin” or “thick” (Section 2.1), this gives us 
two options:  
 
FT1: Sensory individuals are thin particulars. 
FT2: Sensory individuals are thick particulars.  
 
I will examine both options.  
 
4.2.1 Tracking thin particulars? 
	
13 Obviously, this would not refute FT, but it would invalidate Fish’s scientific claim, thus forcing FT’s friends to look 
for other arguments. 
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Thin particulars are very similar to bare particulars (Loux, 1978; Sider, 2006), that is, 
particulars shorn of every property. The main difference between thin and bare 
particulars is that, within the ontology of facts, thin particulars are a mere abstraction; 
fact ontology rests on the assumption that there are no bare particulars (Armstrong, 
1989, p. 88). We can only get at thin particulars via an intellectual process (Section 
2.1). This may give us two possible ways of understanding FT1: Perhaps, sensory 
individuals are thin particulars singled out directly by detection mechanisms; or, they 
are detected indirectly thanks to a specific set of conceptual skills.  
 The first option strikes one as obviously implausible. Thin 
particulars can only be given in thought, hence they cannot fix sensory reference. But 
let us suppose that, for argument’s sake, something like thin or bare particulars can 
be found in the environment, and that our perceptual systems are somehow sensorily 
related to them. Assuming fact ontology, the perceiver’s surroundings are populated 
by many different facts. But how can detection mechanisms fix reference to 
something shorn of every property? (Campbell, 1990, p. 7). By way of analogy, 
consider the case of vision vision in a Ganzfeld (Avant, 1965). As we know, exposure 
to an unstructured, qualitatively homogeneous visual field results in a “mist of light” 
or “empty field” visual experience. Nothing can be seen within a Ganzfeld because 
the deployment of discriminatory capacities demands qualitative discontinuities, and 
hence, properties (Pylyshyn, 2003, p. 210). Just as one cannot detect objects in a 
Ganzfeld, so too it is difficult to explain how bare particulars could be detected: 
Precisely because they lack properties, they cannot provide the required 
“fundamental ground” of reference (to use Evans’ terminology).  
 We now turn to the second way of understanding FT1: Thin 
particulars may be detected via the deployment of a specific set of conceptual 
capacities. The only way of making sense of this claim is to place the action of 
conceptual capacities at a very early stage of visual processing. It is implausible that 
all concepts—whatever they are—will be deployed at such an early stage; 
furthermore, it is likely that such concepts will be of a different kind to that of higher-
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level cognitive capacities.14 A version of conceptualism of this sort may be found in 
Xu’s (1997) sortal theory of physical objects.  
 On Xu’s influential account, the concept “PHYSICAL 
OBJECT” is a sortal because it provides identification, counting, and persistence 
conditions even under dramatic changes (e.g., Spelke-objects, Spelke, 1990; Xu & 
Carey, 1996). Xu is committed to a specific form of conceptualism (Heck, 2000), 
according to which object identification is possible only in virtue of possession and 
exercise of the relevant concept. 15  However, conceptualism is not universally 
accepted. Pylyshyn, for example (2007, pp. 93–94; Fodor, 2008, pp. 218–219), argues 
that FINST mechanisms (Section 3.3) do not single out items by means of concepts 
(Raftopoulos, 2009, pp. 89–118). 
 It is not necessary to further articulate these options here. It 
suffices to show that concept deployment at early stages of vision is not meant to 
first detect worldly facts and then decomposing them. Instead, on these views 
concepts are deployed for the identification of objects, and the parsing of the visual 
scene into objects. Notice that this is only possible after the visual system has already 
detected a worldly item, whether represented (as descriptivists claim) or not (as 
acquaintance theories would have it) (Section 3.3). 16  This worldly item may be 
something like a Spelke-bundle (properties like cohesiveness, boundedness, etc.) or 
other kinds of properties. At this point, one may claim that, perhaps, there should 
also be another set of primitive concepts, concepts that allow the visual system to 
detect the thin particular behind the object’s properties, once the material object has 
already been detected. However, this seems unnecessary baroque: Why would the 	
14  For example, Quine (1960) argues that parsing the world into objects requires a fairly advanced conceptual 
armamentarium that is only acquired via language. On this view, combined with BV, we may get something like the 
“old empiricist view” (Section 2.2). 
15 Conceptualism about perceptual content may be construed in different ways. On McDowell’s (1996) version, 
concepts act in receptivity. However, on this account perceptual content is constituted by demonstrative concepts that 
allow for property (and object) re-individuation, so they are not meant to perform the complex function of identifying 
thin particulars. 
16 One possible objection comes from studies like Peterson’s (1994, 2019) who suggests that top-down factors (like 
familiarity with an object) may influence object individuation. What this would show, if anything, is that perceptual 
processes at early stages might be cognitively penetrable, with top-down factors helping to fix visual object formation 
from among multiple interpretations (Green, 2018, p. 25).   
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visual system need to track such an item if sensory reference can already be fixed 
thanks to a specific set of properties?  
 We have seen that an object is only detected in virtue of (some 
of) its properties. At this juncture, friends of FT may raise an obvious concern: 
Nothing I have said so far bears on their thesis. Indeed, as Armstrong forcefully 
states, fact ontology explicitly excludes bare particulars. Nor is there any reason, as 
we have seen, to suppose that thin particulars are tracked or identified as such in 
visual perception. FT1 is thus not the right way to articulate factualism, and so the 
best way to do so is by opting for FT2.  
 
4.2.2 Tracking thick particulars? 
Perhaps sensory individuals are thick particulars, and thick particulars just are facts 
(Section 2.1). Before I proceed, we must first stop and say something about such 
properties. When we sensorily relate to an item in the world, that relation is 
constitutively a relation to numerically distinct and unrepeatable entities: I am now 
perceptually related to this laptop, seeing this copy of Collingwood’s The Principles of 
Art, and so forth (Schellenberg, 2016). However, properties are construed, it seems 
clear that at least in genuine cases of perception we are related to property instances or 
instantiated properties. With “property instances” I mean simply a non-repeatable 
instance of a property in a given target object, whether it be a trope or a universal 
instantiated by a fact (Armstrong, 1997, p. 126).  
 What kind of property instances are needed to secure sensory 
reference? There is little agreement in the scientific literature. Pylyshyn (2001, p. 145) 
suggests that after an initial pre-attentive and pre-conceptual parsing of the visual 
scene into proto-objects, tracking mechanisms are grabbed by some properties of 
the proto-objects. In several works (Pylyshyn, 2003, 2007, p. 68; also Bahrami et al. 
2003; Blaser at al., 2000; Scholl et al., 1999) he urges that, since we can track objects 
in spite of featural change, and that features are only processed at later stages of 
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visual processing, sensory reference cannot be secured by features.17 On this ground, 
Pylyshyn thinks we ought to operate a distinction between represented (as Pylyshyn 
says, “encoded”) features—that is, the properties that are manifest in our states of 
seeing (like colors, shape, etc.)—and a distinct class of physical properties that mainly 
serve the role of connecting a sensory individual to a tracking mechanism. Physical 
properties, on Pylyshyn’s account, are not represented but interact causally with the 
FINSTs,18 and it is largely an empirical matter to determine which physical properties 
may grab a FINST mechanism (Pylyshyn, 2007, p. 211). Pylyshyn’s functional 
distinction between two kinds of properties does not fit squarely with the empirical 
evidence, however. In most cases, it seems that spatio-temporal properties are 
required to detect an object at a pre-attentive stage (Driver at al., 2001; Pylyshyn, 
2001; Scholl & Leslie, 1999). There is some evidence that temporal synchrony, 
continuity and proximity usually override featural criteria of object detection (Carey 
& Xu, 2001; Pylyshyn, 2003; Scholl & Leslie, 1999). This leads to the plausible 
conjecture that there must be some mechanisms sensitive only to spatio-temporal 
information (Raftopoulos, 2009, p. 94; also Carey & Xu, 2001; Xu & Carey, 1996). 
In a famous study, Spelke et al. (1995) showed that infants normally use spatio-
temporal information to individuate objects. Yet, it has also been shown that infants 
may use features like shape and color to individuate objects when spatio-temporal 
information does not provide sufficient criteria of individuation (Tremoulet et al. 
2000). This seems to provide some prima facie reason to reject Pylyshyn’s distinction 
between physical properties and features.  
 Once again, I take an ecumenical approach: I will not opt for a 
specific theory of sensory reference. Given that on FT2 sensory individuals are facts, 
the next question to consider is what kind of properties clothes the particular. The 	
17 In a passage, Pylyshyn actually states that the speed of objects’ motion or the rate at which they change direction 
seem to play a role in fixing sensory reference (2007, p. 68, fn. 2). However, he adds that these properties also “do not 
appear to be encoded” (i.e., represented).   
18 A reviewer has pointed out to me that the distinction between features and physical properties is quite obscure. 
Following Pylsyhyn, I assumed that the distinction is grounded on the different functional roles such properties play 
relative to the perceptual system. Perhaps, at least some physical properties may be interpreted as impure non-
qualitative properties, like “being next to item y” or “being brighter than y” (Cowling, 2015). My argument against FT, 
however, does not depend in any way on the plausibility of this distinction. 
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first option is to entertain a thesis which preserves Pylyshyn’s distinction between 
physical properties and features. This can be translated as follows: 
 
FT2*: Sensory individuals are particulars instantiating both physical 
properties and features. 
 
FT2* accommodates a broad spectrum of options for fixing sensory reference, on 
the assumption that we can make sense of the distinction between features and 
physical properties. One can follow Pylyshyn and claim that only the latter fix sensory 
reference, or accommodate the intuition that, while keeping this distinction, features 
might occasionally contribute to fixing sensory reference. But suppose that someone 
casts doubt on this distinction. We might thus formulate a second option in which 
sensory individuals are particulars instantiating multiple properties, only a subset of 
which will be perceptually relevant: 
 
FT2**: Sensory individuals are particulars instantiating perceptually relevant 
properties.19  
The difference between the two options is meant to reflect the disagreement in 
perception studies about what sort of properties may fix sensory reference; plus, it 
reflects my catholic approach to this matter. 
 Consider FT2*. One may accept this if one believes that 
features cannot, or sometimes cannot, fix sensory reference, for all that FT2* claims is 
that not only sensory individuals are facts, but that their relevant properties are the 
kind of entities that may fix sensory reference under a broad spectrum of possibilities. 
	
19 The construct “perceptually relevant properties” is meant to capture the following ideas: first, that not all of an 
object’s properties are relevant for visual perception (we do not see an object’s weight); second, it makes room for a 
conception of sensory reference and perception that does not rely on Pylshyn’s distinction between different kinds of 
properties. The Tremoulet et al. (2000) study goes in this direction, as the authors maintain that features may also play 
a role in sensory-reference fixing. I thus prefer to speak of “perceptually relevant properties”, allowing such properties 
to be manifest in seeing as well as helping fixing sensory reference. I thank a reviewer for suggesting this option. 
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Hence, one may contend that sensory reference is fixed by means of physical 
properties alone, although such properties may neither be represented nor accessible 
in states of seeing. Pylyshyn is not always clear about what is exactly being tracked: “ 
… if the FINST was captured by a property P, what the FINST refers to need not 
be P, but the bearer of P (the [sensory individual] that has property P)” (2007, p. 96); 
“I take the view that objects are indexed directly, rather than via their properties or 
their locations” (2003, p. 202).20  
 Following Fish’s first assumption, one might think that the 
bearer of P is a fact’s particular. Might this be a fact’s thin particular? As I have argued 
(Section 4.2.1), the claim that the visual system may track thin particulars is 
untenable. Since we need properties, such “bearers of P” might be thick particulars 
(facts) or property bundles. Either option would work, provided that they instantiate 
the right sort of properties, that is, properties that the visual system might exploit for 
purposes of detection and tracking. One may amend Pylyshyn’s contention and claim 
that although a tracking mechanism is grabbed by property P, reference is fixed to 
the fact as a whole in virtue of some other properties, or by means of some other 
properties of the bundle. In general, the claims I make are fully compatible both with 
Pylshyn’s commitment that detection and tracking mechanisms are non-descriptive 
(acquaintance theory), and with the rival view that such mechanisms are 
representational (descriptivism).  
 But notice that, if what I say is correct, it strongly suggests, in 
compliance with Betti’s second criterion, that all we need to single out and track items 
in the world are property instances! Notice also that the true metaphysical nature of 
such bearers is beyond the purview of perception. The only requirement mandated 
by the scientific evidence is that the material object must possess the right sort of 
properties (physical properties or features, or an indistinct set of perceptually relevant 
properties). Thus, determining whether the material object, qua worldly thing, is a 	
20 These passages are ambiguous, but Pylyshyn (2003) also stresses that, “there must be some properties that cause index 
assignment and that make it possible to keep track of certain objects visually—they may just constitute a very 
heterogeneous set and may differ from case to case” (p. 213).  
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fact or property-bundle depends on metaphysical grounds that have nothing to do with 
evidence gathered from the science of perception.21  
 Now, suppose that Pylyshyn is wrong, and that sometimes 
both features and physical properties fix sensory reference. If this is correct, then 
once again it seems that property instances alone are required to fix sensory 
reference, and in virtue of Betti’s second criterion, there is no need to invoke any 
facts’ particulars, let alone complex entities forming non-mereological unities (Fish’s 
second assumption). 
 I turn now to FT2**. FT2** hinges on the suspicion that there 
is no legitimate distinction to be drawn between features and physical properties. But 
as the reader, by now, will easily understand, the same considerations developed 
about FT2* will apply to FT2** as well. If properties are all we need to fix sensory 
reference and tracking, then the scientific evidence does not license any factualist 
reading.  
 Under all interpretations, Betti’s second ontological criterion 
suggests that we find all the indispensable ontological tools in property-instances, 
however such properties are instantiated. The latter point is important, for it seems clear 
that perceptual psychology does neither reveal the metaphysical nature of property 
instances (tropes or universals), nor the metaphysical composition of material 
objects. For all we know, we are related to property instances of (material) objects in 
the world, and it is only thanks to some further metaphysical argument that we may 
call them instantiated universals, or tropes. If this is true, it follows that we do not 
have scientific reasons to introduce “particulars” to fix sensory reference, let alone 
construe visual objects as non-mereological units constituted by particulars plus 
properties. Material objects—that is, things in the world—are detected and then seen 
in virtue of their properties, and properties alone. It is important to reiterate that my 
claim is not meant to reveal anything about the “true nature” of material things in the 
	
21 Notice that adopting a fact ontology on independent, metaphysical grounds, leaves still open the question of 
factualism.  
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world, but only of visual objects. Things in the world may be, among other things, facts 
or trope-bundles.  
 
4.2 Tracking without facts 
I have shown that, contrary to Fish’s assumptions, the scientific claim is inconclusive. 
But at this point, one might cast doubt on the plausibility of my considerations on 
the basis of the experiments reviewed earlier (Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). Blaser et al. 
(2000) have nicely illustrated that features alone cannot always account for objects 
detection and tracking precisely because features might change (the Gabors changed 
saturation, motion direction, etc.). In other words, a change in features does not 
disrupt tracking (Scholl, 2001). A feature P (say, “the rose’s redness”) may first grab 
a FINST (or any other tracking mechanism) and allow object detection or individuation, 
but as Pylyshyn pointed out (2007, p. 96; Section 4.2.2), the tracking mechanism 
needs not refer to P—as P might change or disappear, like in the Blaser et al. (2000) 
experiment—but to the bearer of P. Fish seems to interpret this bearer as a fact’s 
particular of which P is predicated. Fixing sensory reference to such a categorically 
distinct entity seemingly has the virtue of explaining the fact that sensory reference 
is fixed on a property bearer. However, for the reasons examined earlier (Section 
4.2), factualism is either unwarranted by perceptual psychology or plainly at odds 
with it. How can we make sense of keeping track of material objects (sensory 
individuals) while being only sensorily related to their property instances? 
 To see how this might work, let us first recall that object 
tracking seems to occur not only via its qualitative properties or features, but also 
thanks to spatio-temporal information (Raftopoulos, 2009, p. 94). Xu and Carey 
(1996), for instance, have shown that 10-month old infants can employ spatio-
temporal information to infer the existence of occluded objects, whereas 12-month 
infants are able to exploit both spatio-temporal and featural information, especially 
when spatio-temporal information is ambiguous (Tremoulet et al., 2000). This is 
most evident in the Blaser et al. (2000) experiment, where the superimposed Gabor 
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patches changed features, but were nonetheless perceived as spatially segregated and 
standing in a figure-ground relation. Once the sensory individual has been detected, 
thanks to some property instance P, tracking might occur. Moreover, notice that 
tracking is a relatively high-level capacity of the visual system, and this means that, at 
this point, a fairly good amount of information will have been sampled into the 
corresponding object file. This means that the perceptual system might rely on 
multiple properties to keep track of the sensory individual, with some of them 
(perhaps) being featural and spatio-temporal in nature. (Whether such properties are 
all in principle consciously accessible, or even represented, is an interesting and 
important question, but it goes beyond my argumentative aims.)  
 Let us consider a sensory individual, call it object, a red rose. 
Object first grabs a FINST in virtue of its property (a feature, or physical property, or 
simply perceptually relevant property) P1 (say, “being red”). At t1, object possesses the 
following property instances:  
 
Object at t1: {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5} 
 
(Notice that object will likely possess some non-perceptually relevant properties as 
well, for instance the object’s “having x atoms”, etc., these are not included in the set.) 
Since object has now been detected, several of its properties, like shape, orientation, 
and spatio-temporal information are being sampled in the object file. The tracking 
system (a FINST, deictic codes, or other putative tracking mechanisms) now has a 
pool of properties to rely on. It can track P1 and P2, or P2 and P3, or any other 
conjunction of multiple property instances. Now, let us assume object loses P1 at t2, 
and gains P6 (say, “blueness”), and so we get: 
  
Object at t2: {P6, P2, P3, P4, P5} 
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Clearly, if tracking were to rely exclusively on P1, the object would be “lost” to the 
perceptual system. However, as I pointed out, the visual system exploits multiple 
properties to keep track of items. In our case, it can keep track of P2 and P3, or of P3 
and P4, and so on. Thus, tracking can continue over time in spite of featural or property 
change. Notice also that in my example, the properties in curly brackets need not be 
features like shape and colors, but may be any perceptually relevant properties 
(spatio-temporal ones (Section 4.2.2)).  
 In my example the sensory individual is an object, a “spatio-
temporally confined and continuous entity that can move while taking its features 
with it” (Matthen, 2005, p. 281), it is capable of receiving “contraries” (say, red, and 
later blue) (Section 3.2.2), regardless of its ontological status, it can be a fact, or a 
bundle (if we accept the existence of properties). For detecting and tracking, the 
perceptual system only needs (some of) object’s property instances. All of these details 
thereby lend support to the truth of S-BV (Section 3.4). Notice that in the account I 
have just sketched out, the sensory individual still plays all its functions: It remains 
constant through featural change (it is always the same item, even though it changes 
properties), 22  it provides the fundamental ground of reference in virtue of its 
property instances, and it provides an external “unifier” to which multiple properties 
are attached and/or predicated of. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
A closer scrutiny of the empirical literature reveals that, contrary to what Fish 
suggests, we have neither scientific nor phenomenological evidence for FT. Perhaps, one 	
22 The object’s acquiring new properties while losing others provides a twofold challenge. On the one hand, there is 
the metaphysical problem of accounting for identity and property change. While in fact’s ontology the particular 
provides such a ground for identity through change, bundle theorists also have different options available, such as 
Simons’ (1994) nucleus theory. On the other hand, there’s the scientific problem of identifying the psychological 
criteria for the perceptual persistence of objects through change. This issue demands a separate discussion.  
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might establish the truth of FT on some other grounds: This is why the paper’s title 
has an interrogative form, suggesting that the claim that we see facts may not be as 
obvious as some philosophers might assume, but stands in need of argumentative 
support. I leave it to my readers to elaborate upon the further implications, 
epistemological and phenomenological, of my claims. 
 
 
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
For comments and discussions on earlier versions of this paper, special thanks to 
Marcin Miłkowski, Tobias Schlicht, and Albert Newen. Many thanks also to: Ori 
Beck, Peter Brössel, Dan Burnston, Filipe Carijó, Tim Crane, Krys Dołȩga, Adrian 
Downey, Craig French, Alex Grzankowski, Beate Krickel, Francesco Marchi, Judith 
Martens, Giulia Martina, Luca Moretti, Joe Neisser, Jim Pryor, Luke Roelofs, Eva 
Schmidt, Tobias Starzak, Alexander Staudacher, Philipp Steinkrüger, Elmarie Venter, 
Filippo Vindrola, Markus Werning, and the anonymous reviewer of M&L.  
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Aristotle (1963). Categories and De Interpretatione. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Armstrong, D. (1989). Universals: An opinionated introduction. Boulder-London: Westview Press. 
 
Armstrong, D. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Armstrong, D. (2010). Sketch for a systematic metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Arstila, V. (2016). Theories of apparent motion. Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences, 15, 337-358.  
 
Austin, J. L. (1962). Sense and sensibilia. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
 
Avant, L. L. (1965). Vision in the Ganzfeld. Psychological Bulletin, 64, 246-258. 
 
Ayers, M. (2004). Sense experience, concepts and content: Objections to Davidson and McDowell. In Schumacher, R. 
(Ed.), Perception and reality: From Descartes to the present (pp. 239–262). Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.  
 
  30	
Bahrami, B. (2003). Object property encoding and change blindness in multiple object tracking. Visual Cognition, 10, 
949–963.  
 
Betti, A. (2015). Against facts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Blaser, E., Pylyshyn, Z., & Holcombe, A. (2000). Tracking and object through feature space. Nature, 408, 196–199.  
 
Block, N. (2014). Seeing-as in light of vision science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89, 560-572. 
 
Burge, T. (2010). Origins of objectivity. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
 
Campbell, K. (1990). Abstract particulars. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Carey, S., & Xu, F. (2001). Infants’ knowledge of objects: Beyond object files and object tracking. Cognition, 80, 179–
213. 
 
Chan, L. K. H., & Hayward, W. G. (2009). Feature integration theory revisited: Dissociating feature detection and 
attentional guidance in visual search. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 35, 119-132.  
 
Clark, A. (2000). A theory of sentience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Clark, A. (2004). Feature-placing and proto-objects. Philosophical Psychology, 17, 443-469.  
 
Cohen, J. (2004). Objects, places, and perception. Philosophical Psychology, 17, 471-495. 
 
Cowling, S. (2015). Non-qualitative properties. Erkenntnis, 80, 275-301. 
 
Crane, T. (2009). Is perception a propositional attitude? The Philosophical Quarterly, 59, 452-469.  
 
Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co.  
 
Devitt, M. (1997). “Ostrich nominalism” or “mirage realism”? In Mellor, D. H., & Oliver, A., (Eds.), Properties (pp. 93-
100). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
DiCarlo, J. J., Zoccolan, D., & Rust, N. C. (2012). How does the brain solve visual object recognition? Neuron, 73, 415-
434. 
 
Dickie, I. (2010). We are acquainted with ordinary things. In Jeshion, R., (Ed.), New essays on singular thought (pp. 213-
245). New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Di Lollo, V. (2012). The feature-binding problem is an ill-posed problem. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16, 317-321. 
 
Dretske, F. (1979). Simple seeing. In Gustafson, D. F., & Tapscott, B. L., (Eds.), Body, mind, and method (pp. 1-15). 
Dordrecht: Kluwer.  
 
Dretske, F. (2010). What we see: The texture of conscious experience. In Nanay, B., (Ed.), Perceiving the world (pp. 54-
67). New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Driver, J., Davis, G., Russell, C., Turatto, M., & Freeman, E. (2001). Segmentation, attention and phenomenal visual 
objects. Cognition, 80, 61-95.  
 
Evans, G. (1982). The varieties of reference. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
 
Feldman, J. (2003). What is a visual object? TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 252-256. 
 
Firth, R. (1965). Sense-data and the percept theory. In Schwarz, R., (Ed.), Perceiving, sensing, and knowing (pp. 204-270). 
London: University of California Press.  
 
Fish, W. (2009). Perception, hallucination, and illusion. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Fodor, J. (2008). LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
  31	
Franconeri, S., Alvarez, G., & Cavanagh, P. (2013). Flexible cognitive resources: Competitive content maps for 
attention and memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17, 131-141. 
 
Garcia, R. (2014). Bundle theory’s black box: Gap challenges for the bundle theory of substance. Philosophia, 4, 115-
126. 
 
Garson, J. W. (2001). (Dis)solving the binding problem. Philosophical Psychology, 14, 381-392. 
 
Green, E. J. (2018). A theory of perceptual objects. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99, 663-693. 
 
Green, E. J., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2017). What is an object-file? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx055.  
 
Grill-Spector, K. (2003). The neural basis of object perception. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 13, 1-8. 
 
Grill-Spector, K., & Kanwsiher, N. (2005). Visual recognition: As soon as you know it is there, you know what it is. 
Psychological Science, 16, 152-160.  
 
Heck, R. (2000). Non-conceptual content and the “space of reasons”. Philosophical Review, 109, 483-523.  
 
Jackson, F. (1977). Perception: A representative theory. London: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Johnston, M. (2006). Better than mere knowledge? The function of sensory awareness. In Gendler, T. S., & Hawthorne, 
J., (Eds.), Perceptual experience (pp. 260-290). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kahneman, D., Treisman, A., & Gibbs, B. (1992). The reviewing of object-files: Object-specific integration of 
information. Cognitive Psychology, 24, 175-219.  
  
Kolers, P., & Pomerantz, J. (1971). Figural change in apparent motion. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 87, 99-108.  
 
Lewis, D. K. (1966). Percepts and color mosaics in visual experience. The Philosophical Review, 75, 357-368.  
 
Loux, M. J. (1978). Substance and attribute. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
 
Martin, C. B. (1980). Substance substantiated. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58, 3-10.  
 
Matthen, M. (2004). Features, places, and things: Reflections on Austen Clark’s theory of sentience. Philosophical 
Psychology, 17, 497-518.  
 
Matthen, M. (2005). Seeing, doing, and knowing. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
McDowell, J. (1996). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Mulligan, K. (1999). Perception, particulars, and predicates. In Fisette, D., (Ed.), Consciousness and intentionality (pp. 163-
194). Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
Mulligan, K., Simons, P., & Smith, B. (1984). Truth-makers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 287-321. 
 
O’Callaghan, C. (2008). Object perception: Vision and audition. Philosophy Compass, 3, 803-829. 
 
O’Callaghan, C. (2016). Objects for multisensory perception. Philosophical Studies, 173, 1269-1289. 
 
Op de Beeck, H., Haushofer, J., & Kanwisher, N. G. (2008). Interpreting fMRI Data: Maps, modules, and dimensions. 
Nature Reviews: Neurscience, 9, 123-135. 
 
Pautz, A. (2007). Intentionalism and perceptual presence. Philosophical Perspectives, 21, 495-541. 
 
Peterson, M. A. (1994). Object recognition processes can and do operate before figure-ground organization. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 3, 105-111. 
 
Peterson, M. A. (2019). Past experience and meaning affect object detection: A hierarchical Bayesian approach. In 
Federmeier, K. D., & Beck, D.M., (Eds.), Knowledge and vision (pp. 223-257). Cambridge, MA: Academic Press. 
  32	
 
Pinna, B., & Deiana, K. (2015). Material properties from contours: New insights on object perception. Vision Research, 
115, 280-301.  
 
Pylyshyn, Z. (2003). Seeing and visualizing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Pylyshyn, Z. (2004). Some puzzling findings in multiple object tracking: I. Tracking without keeping track of object 
identities. Visual Cognition, 11, 801-822.  
 
Pylyshyn, Z. (2007). Things and places. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
 
Quine, W. v. O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Raftopoulos, A. (2009). Cognition and perception: How do psychology and neural science inform philosophy? Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.  
 
Recanati, F. (2012). Mental files. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Reicher, M. E. (Ed.) (2009). States of affairs. Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag. 
 
Rosch, E., Mervis, C.B., Gray, W., Johnson, D. M., & Boyes-Braem, P. (1976). Basic objects in natural categories. 
Cognitive Psychology, 8, 382-439.  
 
Russell, B. (1986). The philosophy of logical atomism and other essays 1914–1919. London: George Allen & Unwin. 
 
Schellenberg, S. (2016). Perceptual particularity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93, 25-54. 
 
Scholl, B. (2001). Objects and attention: The state of the art. Cognition, 80, 1-46.  
 
Scholl, B., Pylyshyn, Z., & Franconeri, S. (1999). When are featural and spatiotemporal properties encoded as a result 
of attentional allocation? Investigative Ophthalmology and Visual Science, 40, 4195. 
 
Scholl, B., Pylyshyn, Z., & Feldman, J. (2001). What is a visual object? Evidence from target merging in multiple object 
tracking. Cognition, 80, 159-177.  
 
Scimeca, J. M., & Franconeri, S. L. (2015). Selecting and tracking multiple objects. WIREs Cognitive Science, 6, 109-118.  
 
Sider, T. (2006). Bare particulars. Philosophical Perspectives, 20, 387-397. 
 
Siegel, S. (2002a). Review of a theory of sentience, by Austen Clark. Philosophical Review, 111, 135-138.  
 
Siegel, S. (2002b). The role of perception in demonstrative reference. Philosophers’ Imprint, 2, 1-21. 
 
Siegel, S. (2010). The Contents of visual experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Silver, M. A., & Kastner, S. (2009). Topographic maps in human frontal and parietal cortex. Trends in Cognitive Science 
13, 488-495.  
 
Simons, P. (1994). Particulars in particular clothing: Three trope theories of substance. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 54, 553-575. 
 
Smith, B. (1989). Constraints on correspondence. In Gombocz, W. L. Rutter, & H. Sauer, W., (Eds.), Traditionen und 
Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie: Festschrift für Rudolf Haller (pp. 415-430). Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.  
 
Skrzypulec, B. (2018). Thisness and visual objects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9, 17-32. 
 
Somers, D. C., & Shermata, S. L. (2013). Attention maps in the brain. WIREs Cognitive Science, 4, 327-340.  
 
Spelke, E. (1990). Principles of object perception. Cognitive Science, 14, 29-56. 
 
Textor, M. (2009). Are particulars or states of affairs given in perception? In Reicher, M. E., (Ed.), States of affairs. (pp. 
129-150). Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag. 
  33	
 
Thompson, B. (2009). Senses for senses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87, 99-117.  
 
Treisman, A. (1986). Properties, parts and objects. In Boff, K. R., Kaufman, L., & Thomas, J. P. (Eds.), Handbook of 
perception and human performance, volume 2 (pp. 1-70). New York: John Wiley and Sons.  
 
Treisman, A. (1996). The binding problem. Current Opinion Neurobiology, 6, 171-178.  
 
Treisman, A., & Gelade, G. (1980). A feature integration theory of attention. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 97-136.  
 
Tremoulet, P., Leslie, A. M., & Hall, D. G. (2000). Infant individuation and identification of objects. Cognitive 
Development, 15, 499-522.  
 
Vallicella, W. (2000). Three conceptions of states of affairs. Noûs, 34, 237-259. 
 
Wolfe, J. (1998). Visual search. In Pashler, H., (Ed.), Attention (pp. 13-73). London: Psychology Press. 
 
Xu, F. (1997). From Lot’s wife to a pillar of salt: Evidence that physical object is a sortal concept. Mind & Language, 
12, 365-392.  
 
Xu, F., & Carey, S. (1996). Infants’ metaphysics: The case of numerical identity. Cognitive Psychology, 30, 111-153. 
